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For a private corporation, or a commercial bank, accounting data are a means by which management 
accounts to shareholders for its performance. In these cases performance is measured by profits and 
the net worth of the firm. The interpretation of accounting statements is more complicated for central 
banks, as their main objective is not to maximise profits but to accomplish social goals such as low 
inflation and a stable financial sector. Striving for these goals will affect the central bank’s accounts but 
the accounts will not give direct information on its performance in achieving them.
2 However, central 
bank balance sheets may reveal a lot about the institutional environment affecting the conduct of 
monetary policy, including the relative degree of central bank independence.
3  
This paper reviews how a central bank’s involvement in activities such as foreign exchange 
intervention and restructuring banking systems at the behest of the government may affect its balance 
sheet and the possible implications. Section 2 argues that if such operations leave the central bank 
with low, or even negative, capital its (perceived) independence and ability to conduct monetary policy 
may be affected. Section 3 sets out some stylised facts about central banks’ balance sheets, and 
highlights the role of seigniorage in increasing capital and that of the main quasi-fiscal activities in 
reducing capital.  
2.  Does capital matter for a central bank?  
Central banks are not like other banks. Their sole right to issue domestic currency gives them a 
franchise value not captured by conventional measures of central bank capital.
4 They are not 
concerned with profit maximisation. Their equity is generally not traded. They are implicitly backed by 
the government’s ability to raise taxes. The government could always recapitalise the central bank by 
issuing bonds, and even sell these bonds to the central bank itself - although financial markets may 
take a dim view of such a transaction. Low capital may be desirable, as there may be better uses for 
public funds. Furthermore, it might be argued that a low-capitalised central bank will have to be more 
circumspect in lender of last resort operations and so less moral hazard will arise. Table 1 shows that 
some central banks, in both advanced and emerging economies, operate with very low capital ratios. 
                                                       
1  Gavin Bingham, Arwen Hopkins, Elmar Koch, Madhusudan Mohanty, Ramon Moreno and Philip Turner provided helpful 
comments. Thanks also to Arturo Fernandez, Marc Klau, Dubravko Mihaljek, Paul Moser-Boehm and Agustin Villar for their 
assistance. 
2  Sullivan (2000) argues that profits may be relevant for certain aspects of central bank activity, such as the provision of 
banking services to governments, and that accounting information on costs is relevant for assessing how efficiently the 
central bank has been achieving its goals. However, cash flow statements do not convey much useful information about 
central bank operations. Breuer (1999) notes that successful intervention by central banks to stabilise foreign exchange 
rates should be profitable, as it involves buying low and selling high. 
3  The most common measures of central bank independence in econometric studies refer to legal status (appointment 
procedures, terms of governors, role of board, statutory objectives, limits on lending to governments, etc), the turnover of 
governors and expert opinion. None of the major studies use central bank balance sheet data to construct their measures.  
4  Stella (1997) interprets this franchise value plus the book value of capital as the “net worth”, that is, the value investors 
would be willing to pay if the central bank were put on the market. Fry (1993) estimates that an average central bank 
maximising the steady state level of seigniorage would have a net worth of 100% of GDP. Pringle (2003b) suggests the true 
value of the Federal Reserve System is several times the market capitalisation of Microsoft, the world’s most highly valued 
company. On the other hand, Blejer and Schumacher (2001) focus on explicit or implicit contingent liabilities of central 
banks to argue they really have negative net worth. 
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   Fukui (2003) opines that in practice central banks with low or negative capital have experienced 
difficulties in conducting monetary policy. Approaching the government frequently would compromise 
its (perceived) independence, and may even reduce confidence in the currency. Furthermore, as the 
public may (rightly or wrongly) regard negative net worth as indicating the central bank is poorly run, it 
may erode the bank’s general reputation; see Vaez-Zadeh (1991).  
In some countries, the desired capital of the central bank is made explicit. For example, recent 
legislation in Indonesia prevents the transfer of profits to the government until the central bank builds 
its capital up to 10% of its monetary liabilities. The Reserve Bank of India aims at capital and reserves 
of 8% of assets. In general, the desirable amount of capital depends on the shocks to which the 
balance sheet is subject. This in turn depends on the functions allocated to the central bank (more 
capital if it holds the international reserves) and the policy regime (more capital if defending a peg). 
Blejer and Schumacher (1998) suggest central banks should use an explicit “value-at-risk” approach 
relating capital to the volatility of factors affecting the various components of the balance sheet, and 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has done so; see Sullivan (2000). 
3.  Key influences on central bank balance sheets 
A typical central bank balance sheet 
A generic central bank has a balance sheet composed of domestic currency liabilities and a varying 
mix of domestic and foreign currency assets (Table 1). A central bank may have quite low subscribed 
capital but have built up substantial reserves from retained earnings or put aside large specific 
provisions (Table 2); the arrangements governing the extent to which profits are used to increase 
central bank capital or paid to governments are summarised in Table 5. The central bank’s main 
liabilities are often termed “base money”.
5 The most important liability is often currency (notes, and in 
some cases coin, on issue). Banks generally hold settlement balances with the central bank, which 
may be quite small. They are often required to hold minimum deposits, generally calculated as an 
average over a fortnight or month, which may or may not be remunerated at something like a market 
rate (Table 4).
6 Central banks are often bankers to governments and in Hong Kong SAR, Israel and 
Singapore government deposits are a large proportion of liabilities. 
Some central banks have issued substantial amounts of their own securities as an instrument for 
monetary policy. One advantage of this is that by not needing to hold government securities they may 
avoid the temptation of (indirectly) lending to governments. It may also be a way of funding a 
temporary increase in expenditure without having to go the government for funding, and central bank 
paper can usually be issued at very close to yields on government paper. However, it may not be 
popular with governments as central bank paper could crowd out government issues. It could also lead 
to increased pressure to lend to governments if the central bank can fund such loans through issue of 
its own paper. Central bank paper constitutes around half the central bank’s external liabilities in Korea 
and over a fifth in Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico and Poland (Table 1). In Hong Kong the securities 
were issued to establish a benchmark yield curve to help develop the corporate bond market as well 
as an instrument for open market operations, given that successive government surpluses meant 
there were no government bonds on issue. A number of central banks use their own paper for repo 
operations and collateralised lending; see Mohanty (2002).  
                                                       
5  Terms such as “high-powered money”, “outside money” and “the monetary base” are also used, virtually interchangeably. 
6  Originally the required reserve ratio was seen as a monetary policy tool (in the money base/money multiplier framework), 
but these reserves are now viewed more as a prudential measure and a tax on banks, although they may facilitate the 
operation of monetary policy. 





















Table 1  
Central bank balance sheets  
% to GDP, end-2002 
































Hong Kong   9.8  0.0  0.0  9.7  24.1  5.8  25.8  70.2  0.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  0.0 
India
1  11.6                          2.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 12.0 0.6 6.0 0.3 0.0 1.4
Indonesia                            6.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 6.9 20.5 2.0 18.1 17.2 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.9
Korea                            4.1 2.5 3.2 14.1 1.9 2.9 1.4 23.1 0.2 0.9 5.0 0.1 0.8
Malaysia                            7.6 4.2 15.4 3.4 3.9 2.5 8.4 36.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.2 5.6
Philippines
2                           5.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 15.2 4.5 21.1 2.0 4.5 0.6 0.0 2.2
Thailand                            10.3 0.9 0.1 0.0 1.0 6.5 30.0 31.2 0.4 1.8 5.6 0.0 9.7
                      
Brazil                            3.8 6.0 0.0 5.1 6.7 15.3 0.4 11.7 0.0 20.5 0.0 1.7 3.4
Mexico                            4.3 2.5 0.0 3.7 1.4 0.7 0.6 8.1 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 2.8
Peru                            3.3 5.5 0.1 1.0 5.8 3.0 0.4 17.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.7
Czech rep.
3                           10.1 23.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.4 –2.1 30.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7
Hungary                            7.7 2.2 3.9 8.4 0.5 2.7 0.2 16.9 6.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.6
Poland
2                            6.1 1.6 0.0 2.8 1.4 1.5 5.2 16.5 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.2
Israel                            3.7 10.3 0.0 0.0 10.7 1.1 0.6 23.0 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.5
SouthAfrica                           3.6 1.5 3.4 0.7 0.1 3.6 0.0 6.0 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 4.4
Turkey  2.8                          3.3 1.6 0.0 1.5 19.2 1.0 15.9 0.0 10.5 0.1 0.0 2.9
Australia                            4.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3 1.7 0.8 5.6 0.0 2.8 0.1 0.0 0.1
Canada                            3.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.2
Euro  area                            5.6 0.0 4.0 0.1 0.6 2.2 2.2 5.3 0.3 1.2 5.6 0.2 1.9
Switzerland                           9.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.3 16.7 12.8 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 15.3
1  June 2002.   
2  November 2002.   
3  April 2003.  
Source: Central banks; BIS estimates. 
   
                      
 
 





The central bank generally has a mixture of foreign currency (“international reserves”) and domestic 
currency assets (mostly government bonds and some deposits with banks). Swapping between these 
two types of assets can be an important means of influencing the exchange rate. Domestic monetary 
policy is often implemented by sales and purchases of the domestic currency assets. Occasionally, as 
in Brazil and Malaysia, central banks also have significant claims on the non-bank private sector. 
 
Table 2 
Components of central bank capital 
Percent to total central bank assets 
 Emerging  economies
1  Advanced 
economies
2 
 Median  Maximum  Minimum  Median 
Paid-up capital  0.1  6.2  –4.0  0.0 
Reserves 2.0  18.6  –15.2  2.4 
Revaluation accounts 0.0  16.6  –7.4  5.7 
Provisions 0.0  2.3  0.0  0.0 
Retained profits  0.0  31.7  –2.5  0.0 
Total 8.8  31.7  –15.2  15.3 
1  Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.   
2  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
ECB, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
Source: compiled from most recent central bank annual reports as at May 2003. 
 
Recent trends in central bank balance sheets 
Central bank assets have tended to fall relative to GDP over the past two decades. However, there are 
important exceptions. A number of Asian economies concluded after the Asian crisis that it was 
prudent to hold rather larger international reserves; see Hawkins and Turner (1999).
7 They have 
chosen to hold these reserves on the central banks’ balance sheets. Some of these economies have 
floating exchange rates, so the reserves are not there to implement a peg. But they may provide 
assurance that excessively large depreciations could be resisted or speculative attacks repelled 
without resorting to extremely high interest rates. 
To the extent that the international reserves are a form of national precautionary saving, rather than 
directed towards exchange rate objectives, it might be argued that they should be held by a separate 
government agency. This could be akin to the agency in Norway that holds some of the proceeds from 
oil sales or the Land Fund in Hong Kong, which held the proceeds from property sales until 1998. 
There are some countries, such as Canada, where the international reserves are at least partly held 
by authorities other than the central bank. But in emerging economies, the central bank may bring the 
most competence, independence and transparency to the management of such funds. 
Factors affecting the capital of an independent central bank  
While most central banks’ primary focus is monetary policy, they are also involved in a range of other 
activities. Some of these, such as bank supervision, contribute to operating costs but have no other 
                                                       
7  In Pringle and Carver’s (2003) survey, over 90% of central banks expected reserves to be built up further. 
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impact on their balance sheets. Most central banks no longer make loans to the private sector. The 
main means by which an independent central bank’s capital is increased is through seigniorage, and it 
is reduced by distributions of profits to the government. These influences are discussed further below. 
Seigniorage 
Seigniorage is the profit that accrues to central banks from their being in a special position of paying 
no or low interest on two of their main liabilities: currency and banks’ deposits with the central bank. 
Seigniorage arising from the issue of currency (Table 3) is calculated as a market interest rate (at least 
a potential rate of return on central bank assets) multiplied by currency on issue (ignoring costs of 
printing the currency, as these are relatively small in all but the smallest economies). Currency 
seigniorage has declined in a number of emerging economies as inflation rates have fallen.  
An argument fashionable some years ago that there was a (high) optimal rate of inflation, and thus 
seigniorage, based on the costs (including distortions) of other taxes, has fallen out of favour.
8 Such a 
high inflation rate would have adverse consequences for economic efficiency. 
Furthermore, in the longer term people will move away from holding inflation-prone currencies, so the 
short-term increase in seigniorage revenue may be more than offset by a longer-term decline. 
Nowadays central banks aim at low inflation and accept that seigniorage is likely to remain low. 
 
Table 3 
Currency seigniorage/GDP (%) 
  Average early 1980s  Average 1999-2001 
China 1.3
1 0.7 
Indonesia 0.4  0.3 
Korea 0.3  0.2 
Philippines 1.4  0.6 
Singapore 0.4  0.1 
Thailand 0.3  0.1 
Brazil 3.9 0.8 




2  0.3 
Russia 5.1
2 1.4 
South Africa  0.2  0.2 
Advanced economies
3 0.2  0.1 
1  1985-90.   
2  1990-95.   
3  Simple average of Australia, Canada, Sw itzerland and the United Kingdom. 
 
A second type of seigniorage arises from the funds banks hold with the central bank. As required 
reserve ratios have been reduced over time, and closer to market rates have been paid on these 
compulsory balances, this source of seigniorage has become less important, although it is still higher 
in some emerging economies than in advanced economies (Table 4). 
                                                       
8  Fischer et al (2002) conclude that seigniorage is maximised when inflation reaches 174%. By contrast, their reading of the 
literature is that economic growth in emerging economies is maximised at inflation rates below 50%, probably below 10%. 




Seigniorage accruing from banks’ balances with central banks 
  Required 
deposits 
Interest rate paid on 






GDP (%), 2001 
Seignorage/GDP 
(%), 2001 
China 6%  1.9%  27 0.1 
Hong Kong SAR   No  Market rate
2  10 None 
India  3-5.5%  6.5% (at bank rate)  4  0.1 
Indonesia 5%  None  4  0.6 
Korea 2.9%  None  3 <0.1 
Malaysia 4%  None  17  0.5 
Philippines 11%
3  4% (on 40% of  
required deposits) 
4  <0.3 
Singapore 3%  None 5  0.1 
Thailand 6%  None  3  0.2 
        
Brazil 0-45%
4  9.8% 6  0.6 
Chile 3.6-9.0%
5  Half of previous 
month’s inflation rate 
35  
Colombia 2.5-13.0%  75-100%  of 
inflation target 
2 0.1 
Mexico None  Market  rate
2 2  None 
Peru  6%  None on required 
deposits; 2% on other 
10 1.0 
        
Czech Republic  2%  Repo rate on 
required deposits 
16  <0.8 
Poland 4.5%  None  4  0.6 
Russia 7-10%  None  4  0.5 
        
Israel  0-6%  None on required 
deposits; <market rate 
on excess 
40  <1.0 
South Africa  2.5%  None  2  0.2 
Turkey 6%  40%  8
  1.5 
        
Australia  No  Cash rate less 25 bp
2 1  <0.1 
Euro area  2%  Market rate  5  None 
Japan 0.05-1.2%  None  4  <0.1 
Switzerland No  None  2  <0.1 
United States  3-10%  None  1  <0.1 
1    Reserve money (line 14) less currency (line 14a) from International Financial Statistics.   
2  On  settlement 
balances.   
3  Only applies to commercial banks, not rural and cooperative banks.   
4  45% of the average daily balance of 
demand deposits exceeding BRL 2 million and 10% of the balance of time deposits exceeding BRL 30 million.   
5  Depends 
on currency and maturity of deposits. 
Sources: Mohanty (2002); central banks; IMF, International Financial Statistics; BIS estimates. 
 
Expenditure cuts or revenue increases 
A central bank may also affect its capital position by generating more net revenue. It can pay less on 
banks’ balances with it or charge more for services such as note distribution, bond registries or 
banking facilities for government. Or it could raise reserve requirements on banks, as has been done 
in the past in Brazil and the Philippines. If pushed too far, however, this could amount to excessive 
taxation of the financial system and inhibit its efficient development and growth. 
76  BIS Papers No 20
  
 
Central bank transfers to government and capital injections 
Central bank capital will be reduced by transfers to the government (Table 5). Governments, as the 
“shareholder”, are entitled to receive part of any accumulated profits of the central bank, after a 
prudent proportion of any such profits has been put aside for the capital and reserves of the central 
bank. There may be a rule governing the size of such transfers, it may be at the discretion of the 
central bank, at the discretion of the government, or a matter of negotiation between them (Table 5). 
Most central banks distribute over half their profits; see Kurtzig and Mander (2003) for a further 
discussion. In a few countries central banks also pay tax to the government; see the paper by 
Tetangco in this volume for more on this. 
 
Table 5 
Central bank profits and the government 
Size of transfers/GDP (%) 
  How transfer of central bank profits to 
government is determined 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
China  Government  decides  np np np np np 
Hong Kong SAR    0.8  2.4  3.7  1.5  0.2 
India  CB decides but government may  overrule  0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Indonesia  By  law  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Korea  90% of profits  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 
Philippines  75% of distributable profits  0.4  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Singapore  Minimum shares to reserves and government; 
CB decides on rest 
1.4 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.7 
Thailand  25% of profits to reserve, 90% of remainder to 
bond redemption fund and 10% to government 
0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
         
Argentina By  law  0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 
Brazil  By  law  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Colombia  By  law  0.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.8 
Mexico  Profits transferred after maintaining real capital   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Peru  25% of profits, by law 
np np np np np 
         
Czech Republic  Legislature decides CB budget  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Hungary  Based on average profits of previous  years  0.0 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Poland  <98% of profits, by law  0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Russia  50% of profits  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
         
South Africa  90% of profits,  by  law  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Turkey  20% to reserves, then 6% dividend, by law  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3 
         
Australia  By government, consults with CB  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.2 
Canada All  transferred  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Euro area  CB decides  ...  ...  ...  0.0  0.0 
Notes: np = not published; CB = central bank. 
Sources: Central banks; IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
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There is an asymmetric aspect in the vast majority of countries: profits are transferred to governments 
but losses are met by reductions in capital and reserves. This may present a problem for central banks 
now that most mark to market.
9 While in the longer term the differential between domestic and foreign 
interest rates may offset exchange rate movements, over an annual accounting period exchange rate 
movements can be volatile, generating valuation losses in some years and gains in others. One 
approach to this problem is to transfer extraordinary profits to reserves before making a distribution to 
the government.  
It could be argued that all the current year’s profit should be transferred to the government (after some 
rule-based provisioning) and only the current year’s profit. A discretionary profit distribution might be 
regarded as akin to the central bank providing credit to the government, which, as shown in Table 6, is 
expressly prohibited in many countries. 
Reducing transfers to government will only gradually rebuild the balance sheet. For example, the 
paper by Marshall in this volume refers to a period of several decades. A faster result would require a 
capital injection by the government. A dramatic example of recapitalising a central bank occurred in 
the Philippines in 1992, when a new central bank was created to have a clean start after the previous 
central bank had incurred large bad debts. 
Central banks as bankers to government 
Central bank lending to government 
A survey of central banks by the BIS in 1999 found that the majority were not required, and often not 
allowed, to lend to governments, either by legislation or written agreements with their government. 
Particularly strong prohibitions exist in Brazil, Chile, Peru and Poland, where lending to the 
government is precluded by the constitution. Table 6 shows the recent situation, although of course 
there may be cases where the reality differs from the written provisions. Furthermore, these 
prohibitions may be circumvented by the central bank lending to banks and the government borrowing 
from them; Stasavage (1997) cites instances of this in Africa. The situation would have looked quite 
different a decade ago, when lending to governments was quite a common practice. 
It may be inappropriate to ban completely central bank lending in developing countries with very small 
financial sectors as this might prevent the government from smoothing temporary gaps between 
expenditure and revenue. But it is often argued that such lending should be limited and at market rates 
(as determined by the central bank); see Cottarelli (1993) for a discussion on setting such ceilings. 
Involvement in the government bond market 
The same general arguments against the central bank making loans to governments also apply to 
buying bonds issued by it, particularly if at below market rates. When the government bond market is 
not very deep and budget deficits are high, it may be difficult for central banks to avoid some 
involvement. As the paper by Mohan in this volume points out, being both debt manager and monetary 
authority, the Reserve Bank of India has been supporting the government’s borrowing programme but 
combines such operations with an active liquidity management operation to avoid adverse monetary 
implications. In some emerging economies, it is regarded as desirable for central banks to make 
markets in government bonds in order to develop the markets. But in others, central banks stay away 
from this activity to avoid being caught with large holdings of government securities; see Al-Jasser and 
Banafe (2002). 
Central banks may be involved in the government bond market as a cashier or registrar. This need not 
involve any significant impact on the central bank balance sheet, or conflict with central bank 
independence, so long as it is clear that the central bank is not expected to support prices or transact 
to ensure an orderly market. And there may be advantages to the central bank having such a role, as 
                                                       
9  Pringle (2003a) points out the IMF is pressing central banks to use international financial reporting standards which require 
marking to market, although his own opinion is that it would be better to develop a specific standard for central bank 
accounting. Courtis and Mander (2003) provides a number of papers on central bank accounting issues. 
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the information it acquires may facilitate liquidity management. In Asia, central banks are involved in 
an initiative to develop an “Asian Bond Fund” as an alternative investment vehicle to US Treasuries for 
investing the large international reserves there; see BIS (2003). 
 
Table 6 
Government funding by central banks 
  Overdraft Loan 
Purchase of 






China  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Allowed 
India  Limited, bank rate +2%  Short-term  Allowed  Allowed 
Indonesia Prohibited  by  law  Prohibited by law  Prohibited  Allowed 
Korea  Allowed  Limited amounts at 
rates set by CB 
Allowed Allowed 
Malaysia  Allowed  Limited amounts for 
short term 
Allowed Allowed 
Brazil Prohibited  by  cons  Prohibited by cons  Prohibited  Allowed 
Chile  Prohibited by cons  Prohibited by cons Prohibited  by  cons Prohibited  by 
cons 
Mexico  Mandatory, limited at 
market rate 
Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Allowed 
Peru  Prohibited by cons  Prohibited by cons  Prohibited by cons  Limited 
Czech Republic  Limited by law  Limited by law  Limited amount  Only short-term 
Hungary  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Limited amount  Limited amount 
Russia  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law   
Israel    Limited amounts for 
short term  
Prohibited Allowed 
Turkey  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Allowed 
       
Canada  Limited amount  Limited amount at 
market rates 
Allowed Allowed 
Euro area  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Allowed 
Japan  Prohibited by law  Limited amount  Allowed  Allowed 
United Kingdom  Limited  Prohibited by MT  Prohibited by MT  Allowed 
United States  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Prohibited by law  Allowed 
Note: Cons = constitution; CB = central bank; MT = Maastricht Treaty. 
Sources: Van ‘t dack (1999); central banks. 
 
Government deposits 
In their traditional role as banker to governments, central banks have usually accepted deposits from 
them; see Van ’t dack (1999) for a fuller description. Government deposits can sometimes be a large 
proportion of central bank liabilities, notably in Hong Kong, Israel and Peru; see Table 1. Governments 
may choose to place deposits with the central bank rather than with commercial banks for a number of 
reasons. One is competitive neutrality, not wanting to give an imprimatur to one private bank. Another 
is credit risk; governments know the central bank will not collapse. In some cases, building up the 
central bank balance sheet, and so potentially the amount of international reserves, may be seen as 
usefully bolstering the confidence of foreign investors in the economy. Changes in government 
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deposits affect the money supply and might provide a useful monetary policy tool in those countries 
where central banks have the authority to shift deposits between their books and those of commercial 
banks (for example, Canada, Malaysia and South Africa). When Asian economies faced large capital 
inflows before the 1997 crisis, the depositing of surplus government funds at the central bank helped 
to sterilise part of the rising stock of international reserves.  
Sometimes, government deposits can be a volatile item, leading to problems for liquidity management. 
For this reason in some countries there are coordination and notification arrangements between the 
government and central bank governing movements in deposits. There is also the question of the 
return to be paid on funds placed by governments with central banks, which may hinge on whether the 
central bank is viewed as a “‘banker” or a “funds manager” to the government.
10 
While it could be argued that running down government deposits has the same effect on liquidity as 
the central bank lending to the government, in practice it is not seen as involving the same risks to 
central bank independence or constraints on the operation of monetary policy. 
Quasi-fiscal activities of central banks 
The government may push the central bank into quasi-fiscal activities that lead to central bank losses. 
Examples include intervention in foreign exchange markets, issuance of central bank securities to 
build up foreign reserves, and participation in restructuring of the banking system.  
Avoiding such problems has been facilitated by a shift in sentiment in favour of central bank 
independence. Governments are increasingly willing to tie their own hands and not require central 
banks to be subservient to their fiscal needs. However, it is relatively easy for governments to proclaim 
their central banks to be independent when times are good. When times are bad, governments may 
again be tempted to turn to central banks to help them out of budgetary difficulties. It might be argued 
that to keep financial markets calm, and bond yields low, not only must central banks be independent, 
they must be perceived as independent, and (even more difficult) expected to remain independent.  
Sterilised foreign exchange intervention 
Some central banks have suffered large losses following massive, but futile, intervention in the foreign 
exchange market.
11 Losses are particularly likely if the intervention attempts to defend an exchange 
rate inconsistent with economic fundamentals and other policy settings and goals. For example, the 
government may set an exchange rate target band inconsistent with the interest rate settings required 
to meet an inflation target. In some cases intervention has been an indirect form of subsidy. Quirk et al 
(1988) cite large losses in forward transactions by central banks, as much as several percentage 
points of GDP, to protect exporters or unhedged domestic borrowers from losses.  
In other cases the government may direct the central bank to hold large amounts of international 
reserves and the return on these may fall short of the cost of the central bank borrowing to buy them. 
In Chile, the central bank issued promissory notes in the 1990s to fund accumulation of international 
reserves with a view to holding back the appreciation of the peso, and the resultant interest expenses 
are still causing it to make losses; see the paper by Marshall in this volume. In Mexico, the authorities 
have said they want to limit further accumulation of foreign reserves to prevent such losses mounting 
further; see Mexico Ministry of Finance (2003). In these cases, it might be better if responsibilities are 
made clearer, such as by international reserves being at least partly on the government’s balance 
sheet rather than all with the central bank.  
The involvement of central banks in reviving the financial system 
Central bank balance sheets may be affected by various responses to financial crises (see Hawkins 
and Turner (1999) for a further discussion of such responses): 
                                                       
10  In some cases (such as Japan, South Africa and the United States) government deposits are unremunerated. 
11  Successful foreign exchange interventions will be profitable but in a survey of central banks by Neeley (2000), none 
regarded seeking profits as a motive for such intervention. 
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Extending credit directly to commercial banks. In Indonesia, the central bank provided substantial 
liquidity support to private banks that suffered deposit runs in 1997-98. Nasution’s paper in this volume 
describes how a dispute with the Indonesian government about this left the central bank having to 
make large interest payments but being denied some interest revenues it believes it is owed. In Chile, 
the central bank funded its involvement in bank rescues in the early 1980s by issuing promissory 
notes. The paper by Binay in this volume describes how the central bank’s role in bank restructuring in 
Turkey led to a significant deterioration in its balance sheet, due to both liquidity injections and 
purchases of government paper. There are more positive experiences; in Poland, the central bank 
supported commercial bank restructuring in 1993-97 by purchasing securities issued by banks. The 
operation was quite small (less than 1% of the central bank’s assets) and most of the debt has since 
been redeemed on originally agreed terms. 
Assisting commercial banks by reducing reserve requirements or increasing the interest paid on such 
reserves. For example, during its mid-1990s banking crisis Lithuania lowered reserve ratios from 12% 
to 10%. Argentina relaxed reserve requirements to deal with a bank run in 1995; see Salater (2003). 
Financing asset management corporations (AMCs) established to buy banks’ non-performing loans. 
AMCs usually fund themselves by issuing government-guaranteed bonds, and central banks may be 
pressed to buy some of these bonds. They may also be pressed to take an equity stake in AMCs. For 
example, the People’s Bank of China is funding to a substantial (but uncertain) degree the AMCs that 
hold many of the non-performing loans of the big four state-owned commercial banks. It has offset the 
potential increase in reserve money from these operations with other transactions. However, the 
AMCs may be unable to recover enough from selling the assets they are taking from the banks to 
repay the central bank; see Ma and Fung (2002). Furthermore, the big banks are still not lending on a 
fully commercial basis and more bad loans may arise. 
Financing agencies established to take equity stakes in banks to assist in their recapitalisation. 
Examples include Danamodal in Malaysia and Fobaproa in Mexico (see Hawkins (1999) and 
Graf (1999) respectively). Central banks may also be pressed to lend to, or take equity stakes in, such 
agencies. In Malaysia, the value of the central bank’s equity in Danamodal has been preserved as 
banks have merged and repaid about half the amount provided by Danamodal, and the central bank 
looks likely to be repaid its investment. However in Mexico the outcome looks less favourable. The 
Bank of Mexico lent $100 billion to Fobaproa. The assets of Fobaproa are now being transferred to a 
new government agency, but it apparently will not take over the debt to the Bank, leaving the Bank 
with a large loss. In Thailand, bank recapitalisation was financed by special government bonds largely 
to be repaid from the operating revenues of the central bank; see the paper by Rattakul in this volume. 
Support to borrowers. This is less likely to involve the central bank, although in Mexico a programme 
of subsidised lending to the agricultural sector was transferred to the central bank. 
4. Conclusions 
Central banks, with their special status, do not need large amounts of capital, although they generally 
prefer to have at least positive capital and to maintain their independence from government prefer not 
to have to approach them for funding. Capital can usually be built up as seigniorage exceeds 
operating expenses. Capital is lowered by payments to the government. With mark-to-market 
accounting such payments should only be made after a prudent amount of any extraordinary profits 
are placed in reserves. Most central banks no longer lend to governments. However, governments 
sometimes press central banks to engage in quasi-fiscal activities such as sterilised foreign exchange 
intervention and assisting or restructuring financial intermediaries. In some cases such activities have 
severely eroded central banks’ capital. If only for reasons of transparency and accountability, it might 
be preferable if such activities were instead reflected in the fiscal accounts. 
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